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Abstract 
Arbitration, as an alternative to litigation for contract disputes, reduces costs and time. 
While it has frequently been thought of as a substitute to pretrial bargaining and 
litigation, in fact, parties may be able to reach a settlement privately while engaged in the 
arbitration process. Consequently, the institutional design of the arbitration may 
influence the bargaining. We develop a theoretical model of pre-arbitration bargaining 
that is able to identify the impact of the institutional features on its success. A detailed 
data set from arbitration proceedings in Italy is analyzed. The exogenous heterogeneity in 
the composition of the panel of arbitrators allows us to illustrate its effect on bargaining. 
We show that the number of arbitrators used interacts with their experience and 
independence to reduce uncertainty and facilitate settlement. 
 
Keywords: arbitration, bargaining, contract dispute, Italy, settlement 
JEL classification: K41, C78 
                                                 
+ Department of Economics, Parthenope University, 40 via Medina, 80133 Napoli, 
Italy, riccardo.marselli@uniparthenope.it 
± School of Business, Saint Bonaventure University, P.O. Box 42, Saint Bonaventure, 
NY 14778, U.S.A., bmccannon@sbu.edu 
* DiSEA, University of Sassari, 34 via Torre Tonda, 07100 Sassari, Italy, 
vannini@uniss.it 
* We greatly acknowledge the Camera Arbitrale Milano and its Deputy-Secretary 
General Rinaldo Sali and his staff for providing the data. We also thank Alessio 
Scano for discussions of arbitration and civil law in general of Italy. 
 
 
2 
1. Introduction 
 When a contract dispute arises publicly-provided systems for 
litigation are available. Litigation, though, utilizes substantial amounts of 
public resources, suffers from high opportunity costs for the time of the 
disputants, judge, court personnel, and jurors, and drains private resources. 
Due to these costs, parties to a dispute have the incentive to privately resolve 
the conflict through pre-trial bargaining. Settlement via pre-trial negotiations 
is imperfect though. This “bargaining in the shadow of the law” (Cooter, 
Marks, and Mnookin, 1982) has encouraged a rich literature, focusing on 
optimism bias and asymmetric information, to explain the bargaining 
failures. Given these failures, there has been much interest in alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) as a substitute to the bargaining-litigation 
framework. One common form of ADR is binding arbitration where the 
parties to a contract agree ex ante to resolve any potential dispute with a 
third-party arbitrator or panel of arbitrators who, after reviewing the 
evidence and arguments, select an outcome.  
 The dichotomy between ADR and pre-litigation bargaining has been 
set out by Dari-Mattiacci (2007). He explores the factors that encourage 
parties to ex ante commit to arbitration rather than leave the contract ‘more-
incomplete’ relying on pre-trial bargaining. While an important question 
worthy of additional investigation, one must recognize that private 
resolutions are not separate from the arbitration process, but nested within. 
Bargaining may occur in the shadow of arbitration as well. 
 Our objective is to explore the issue of bargaining over contract 
disputes when failure results in an arbitration decision. The institutional 
features of arbitration vary. Who acts as an arbitrator? Should a panel be 
employed rather than a single decisionmaker? Failures of private resolutions 
are typically argued to be due to uncertainty. Consequently, how the 
institutional design affects the uncertainty and, as a result, facilitates private 
resolutions is an important public policy question.  
 We develop a straightforward theoretical model of bargaining in the 
shadow of arbitration that combines the intuition of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem regarding the optimality of group decisionmaking with the 
economics of uncertainty in bargaining. This allows us to identify which 
factors influence private resolution. We then analyze a data set of arbitration 
cases of the Chamber of Commerce in Milan, Italy (Camera di Commercio). It is 
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common practice to include a clause in contracts in Italy to utilize the 
chamber’s arbitration service (known as the Clausola Compromissoria) The 
parties agree upfront on features of the arbitration process and, hence, the 
institutional design is exogenous to the dispute. After filing, the 
composition/identity of the arbitrators is determined. Many, but not all, of 
the disputes are then resolved. Thus, characteristics of the disputes, the 
actors, and (importantly) the institutional features can be used to explain 
whether or not bargaining is successful. 
 The theoretical model predicts that the uncertainty associated with 
the unknown quality of the decisionmaking of an arbitrator is muted when a 
panel of arbitrators is used. The mitigated uncertainty facilitates private 
resolutions. Empirical evidence is presented confirming this hypothesis. The 
likelihood of a case continuing all the way until a decision is handed down by 
the arbitrators is significantly less likely when a panel of three arbitrators is 
employed rather than only one. Additionally, a result of the theoretical 
model is that amongst three arbitrator panels, if there are divergent beliefs 
regarding the decisionmaking of two arbitrators, uncertainty and bargaining 
failures are more likely than if there is only heterogeneity in assessments over 
one arbitrator. In Italy, arbitrators tend to be either private-practicing 
attorneys or university law professors. The latter have more education, 
publicly-available scholarship, and in general have a better reputation for 
quality decisionmaking. The empirical results show that if the majority of the 
panel of arbitrators is professors, then the likelihood of the dispute persisting 
until the completion of the arbitration process is significantly reduced. 
Hence, the empirical results conform to the theoretical predictions that the 
number of arbitrators and the confidence in the decisionmaking ability of 
those selected reduces uncertainty and facilitates private bargaining. 
 Ours, though, is not the first paper to consider bargaining within an 
arbitration framework. Early work by Crawford (1979; 1982) addresses 
settlement with an arbitrator resolving any dispute that persists. He 
compares conventional arbitration, where the arbitrator selects her most 
preferred outcome, to final-offer arbitration, with the arbitrator restricted to 
selecting amongst the final offers made by the disputants. In his framework 
bargaining always succeeds, as the outcome under arbitration is known when 
bargaining. Exploring bargaining failure, Farmer and Pecorino (1998) 
consider final-offer arbitration where the parties to the dispute have 
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asymmetric information regarding the expected decision of the arbitrator. 
They illustrate that offers can provide information to the other party.1 
Allowing for bargaining after the offers are made facilitates settlement.2 
Extending the analysis to include the voluntary revelation of private 
information, Farmer and Pecorino (2003) illustrate that the transmission of 
information can be used by the uninformed party to make a better final 
offer. Therefore, the informed party has the incentive to withhold private 
information, which could have promoted settlement. Again, if bargaining is 
allowed after final offers are submitted, but before the arbitrator makes her 
decision, then all disputes settle. Experimental evidence supports these 
findings (Van Boening and Pecorino, 2001; 2004). 
 Our work should be seen as a complement to the valuable 
contributions of asymmetric information models of bargaining and 
arbitration. We consider (symmetric) uncertainty of the disputants.3 The 
emphasis here is on differing institutional arrangements and how the 
arbitration setup exacerbates or mitigates the uncertainty, affecting the 
private resolution of conflicts. Furthermore, the strategic informational 
issues arise primarily in final-offer arbitration where the arbitrator is bound 
to one of the two proposals. We consider conventional arbitration 
institutions here, which are common in contract disputes such as those 
utilized in international trade agreements in Europe. 
 Furthermore, the theoretical model considers group decisionmaking 
and, therefore, as stated, builds off of the insights of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem (CJT) (see Mueller (2003) and Young (1988) for a detailed 
discussion). The CJT considers the accuracy of a group’s decision when the 
size of the group expands. Stated broadly, the CJT illustrates that the 
                                                 
1 Farmer Curry and Pecorino (1993) similarly consider asymmetric information 
regarding risk preferences of the disputants. 
2 In their framework, settlement does note arise in 100% of the cases in the 
separating equilibrium. Since the rate of settlement increases in these outcomes with 
renegotiation, but the set of pooling equilibrium (where settlement always occurs) 
reduces, the net effect on settlement rates is ambiguous. 
3 Deck and Farmer (2007) consider symmetric uncertainty and bargaining as well. 
Their framework generates nonempty bargaining zones and, therefore, is unable to 
explain bargaining failure. Their experimental research addresses whether settlement 
rates are correlated with the size of the bargaining zone. 
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decision reached by a group becomes more accurate as the size of the group 
increases.4 The tradeoff between accuracy and the costs to group size is 
considered in McCannon (2011). Here, the interaction between the accuracy 
of the group and the private bargaining is addressed. 
 Previous empirical work has compared conventional and final-offer 
arbitration used for New Jersey fire and police employees (Ashenfelter and 
Bloom, 1984), surveyed practicing arbitrators (Farber and Bazerman, 1986), 
investigated strike frequency with differing legislation on arbitration (Currie 
and McConnell, 1994), examined transfer markets in English football 
(Speight and Thomas, 2003), and evaluated the impact of legal 
representation (Ashenfelter and Dahl, 2012; Ashenfelter, Bloom and Dahl, 
2013) to name a few. Case studies have discussed arbitration in the diamond 
industry (Bernstein, 1992) and private resolutions of contract disputes in 
Vietnam (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Our work also shares similarities 
with Lederman (1999) who uses U.S. Tax Court data to identify which 
factors lead to settlement versus go to trial. Her study does not consider 
arbitration or allow for an institutional analysis. 
  
2. Theoretical Model 
The objective is to provide a simple, straightforward model able to 
integrate theories of uncertainty in bargaining within a framework of group 
decisionmaking. Doing so will allow us to assess the impact of the 
composition of the council of arbitrators on bargaining. 
First, the preliminaries of the theoretical model are presented. Then, 
an analysis of the outcome under alternative institutions is conducted. 
Finally, a comparison of the institutions is undertaken to provide testable 
predictions for the empirical work. 
As will be discussed in detail, the theoretical model will be designed 
to incorporate the procedures used in Italy. Specifically, the model will 
consider arbitration with one and three members and varying composition of 
the panels of three. Also, conventional arbitration, where the arbitrators are 
                                                 
4 There is an expansive literature investigating both asymptotic and non-asymptotic 
versions of the CJT and with various relaxations of the assumptions (e.g. majority 
voting, independent assessments, etc.). 
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free to select any award they see fit, is considered. The setup, though, could 
be extended to model final-offer arbitration. 
 
2.1 Preliminaries 
Suppose there are two parties, denoted X and Y, involved in a 
dispute. Party X is claiming that Y has caused him damages and should be 
compensated. Let d* denote the “actual” or “true” damages incurred. To 
keep the analysis as simple as possible, assume d* ∈ {0, D} where D > 0 and 
that X and Y both know the value of d* with certainty to abstract away from 
asymmetric information issues.5 
There is also a set of potential arbitrators. Let Ai denote Arbitrator i. 
Each arbitrator observes a noisy signal of the true damages caused. Denote di 
as arbitrator i’s signal where di ∈ {0, D}. Let the probability she receives a 
correct signal be denoted pi, or rather, Pr(di = d*) = pi. Hence, one may think 
of pi as capturing an arbitrator’s accuracy.6 Assume pi > ½  ∀i. Also, assume 
i’s accuracy is independent of the true state; Pr(di = d*|d* = D) = Pr(di = 
d*|d* = 0).  
Depending on the institutional rules, the arbitrator(s) makes an 
award to Party X as a result of the arbitration. Denote the reward as R. Costs 
are incurred by both sides. Denote Cx and Cy as the cost to arbitration.7 
Assume both are risk-neutral. Alternatively, the parties to the dispute can 
privately reach an agreement without completing the arbitration process. 
Denote such a settlement as S. Reaching a settlement saves the cost of the 
arbitration procedure and, hence, may be viewed as socially preferable. The 
incentives to reach settlement, though, depend crucially on the institution 
employed, which is the issue we turn to next. 
 
                                                 
5 The assumption that one state of the world has zero damages is a simplifying 
assumption. What is important for the analysis is that the arbitrators have an 
assessment over a range of possible states. The analysis can be extended to multiple 
states as well. 
6 The accuracy is best thought of as an exogenous characteristic of the arbitrator. We 
do not consider arbitrator learning as in Gibbons (1988). 
7 Initiating the arbitration procedure will, of course, involve significant costs. These, 
though, are sunk. Hence, it is best to think of Cx and Cy as the continuation 
(variable) costs that can be avoided. 
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2.2 Arbitration Institutions 
There are two scenarios to consider. In the first, the institutional 
rules require that only one arbitrator is selected to be involved with the 
settling of the dispute. In the second, the institution requires three to be 
selected. These two scenarios are not only the two employed in Italy, but 
also the two dominant forms around the world (Kirby, 2009).  
Let px(d*) denote the accuracy of an arbitrator, as assessed by Party 
X, when the state is d*. Similarly, let py(d*) denote this same probability, as 
assessed by Party Y. As is common in the literature on pretrial bargaining, 
we allow for divergent beliefs of the two parties in the dispute. Also, while 
the accuracy of the arbitration does not depend on the actual damages, we 
allow the beliefs of the parties regarding this accuracy to be state dependent. 
One may think of the disputants as suffering from optimism bias where 
px(D) > py(D) and px(0) < py(0).8  
The tradition of optimistic beliefs in arbitration goes back to Farber 
and Bazerman (1989). For a discussion of uncertainty, differing expectations, 
and conflicts that arise in the selection of private adjudicators see Landes and 
Posner (1979). 
 
2.2.1 One Arbitrator 
If a sole arbitrator must make a decision in the case, then she uses 
her signal, since it is more likely to be accurate than not, in reaching her 
award decision. As stated, we model the arbitration as one of conventional 
arbitration where any outcome may be selected. With regards to the 
arbitrator’s preferences assume the arbitrator has single-peaked preferences 
with her utility maximized at her assessed expected value of the damages 
caused. This is a common assumption when modeling jury decisionmaking 
for example (Friedman and Wickelgren, 2006; McCannon, 2010) and in 
formal models of arbitrator preferences (Farber, 1980; Gibbons, 1988). 
Formally, define R(di = D) = piD as the result she chooses if her signal is of a 
                                                 
8 While it is straightforward to present the environment as a behavioral one with 
heterogeneous beliefs, one could derive similar outcomes assuming asymmetric 
information. What is essential for the analysis is that there exist environments where 
pre-arbitration bargaining can fail so that an analysis of the bargaining zone can be 
conducted.  
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nonzero damage and R(di = 0) = (1 – pi)D as the result if her signal is of zero 
damages. Notice that under the assumption that pi > ½ , R(D) > R(0). 
The parties involved in the dispute, as stated, do not necessarily take 
R(d*) as the expected outcome of arbitration when negotiating over a 
settlement. Define Rt(D) = pt(D)D and Rt(0) = [1 – pt(0)]D as the anticipated 
result for Party t =X, Y when the actual damages are d* = D and d* = 0 
respectively. Party X believes, consequently, that he will receive S with a 
settlement and Rx(d*) – Cx by continuing on with the arbitration process. He 
is willing to accept, then, any settlement where 
 
S ≥ Rx(d*) – Cx.   (1) 
 
Similarly, Party Y receives – S if he settles and – Ry(d*) – Cy if the conflict 
continues until an arbitrator announces an award. Hence, he is unwilling to 
agree to any settlement unless 
 
    S < Ry(d*) + Cy.   (2) 
 
Consequently, if both (1) and (2) hold, then a mutually-agreeable, private 
resolution exists to the conflict. Rather, if 
 
    [px(d*) – py(d*)]D < Cx + Cy 
 when d* = D    
    or    (3) 
    [py(d*) – px(d*)]D < Cx + Cy 
 when d* = 0,      
 
then a nonempty bargaining zone exists.9 Rather than formally modeling 
the bargaining game, we simply presume that if a bargaining zone exists, then 
the parties are able to obtain a settlement. We make this assumption, not 
because the mode of bargaining is unimportant, but rather than study the 
size of the award we are interested in the binary outcome of whether or not 
                                                 
9 This is an extremely common result in the economics of pretrial bargaining. See 
Deck and Farmer (2007) for a detailed discussion. 
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an agreement is reached. A similar tactic is employed by Farmer and 
Tiefenthaler (2001) analyzing the settlement of divorce disputes. 
     
2.2.2 Three Arbitrators 
 Consider the decisionmaking of a three-person panel. The issue 
arises as how to model conventional arbitration outcomes with a panel of 
arbitrators. As before, each arbitrator receives her signal of the state. Since it 
is assumed that for each arbitrator pi > ½, they prefer to follow that signal. 
To keep the analysis simple (and similar to that with one arbitrator) let q 
denote the probability a majority of the arbitrators accurately identify the 
true damages, di = d* and prefer the award, under conventional arbitration, 
to be close to the expected value of the damages. Thus, the arbitrators can 
be expected to award qD if d* = D and (1 – q)D if d* = 0. Hence, an analysis 
of q allows us to compare the decisionmaking of a panel to that of a sole 
arbitrator and to contrast differing arrangements of the panel on arbitration 
outcomes and, consequently, bargaining. 
 Of course, bargaining does not necessarily depend on the accuracy 
of the arbitrators per se, but rather on the expected award, as assessed by the 
parties. As a first scenario to analyze, suppose the disputants are rather 
certain as to the accuracy of two of the arbitrators, but need to form an 
assessment of the third. This would occur if, for an example, two arbitrators 
are appointed by the parties, while the third is selected by the governing 
organization (as is the default in Milan). Let z > ½ be the probability that 
each of the appointed arbitrators is accurate and maintain pt(d*) as the 
assessed accuracy of the third arbitrator by Party t in the state d*. For 
simplicity, the assessments of the accuracy of the first two arbitrators are 
identical for each party. This assumption will later be relaxed.10  
 In this environment the probability of the majority of the arbitrators 
obtaining an accurate signal, qt(d*), as assessed by Party t in state d*, can be 
derived. It follows that 
 
    qt(d*) = z2 + 2pt(d*)z(1 – z). (4) 
 
                                                 
10 The state independence of z is not crucial for the analysis. The results hold if z(d* 
= D) differs from z(d* = 0). 
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As before, a bargaining zone exists if the expected award received by Party 
X, net of the costs, falls short of the award plus the costs, as assessed by 
Party Y, or rather, 
 
    [qx(D) – qy(D)]D < Cx + Cy 
 when d* = D 
or    (5) 
    [qy(0) – qx(0)]D < Cx + Cy 
 when d* = 0. 
 
What we are interested in is the impact of adding arbitrators to the panel 
when there is uncertainty regarding the decisionmaking of an arbitrator. 
Consequently, one needs to assess whether the bargaining zone expands or 
contracts. As can be seen in (3) and (5), both the size of the bargaining zone 
along with the range of parameters in which it is nonempty depends on 
px(d*) – py(d*) as compared to qx(d*) – qy(d*). The following proposition 
provides the first result. All proofs are provided in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 1: With optimistically-biased beliefs, px(D) – py(D) > 
qx(D) – qy(D) > 0 and py(0) – px(0) > qy(0) – qx(0) > 0. 
 
Thus, the uncertainty of the arbitrator’s decisionmaking allows for 
divergence in expected outcomes and facilitates a breakdown in bargaining. 
The effect of this uncertainty is dampened when other arbitrators are added 
to the process. This encourages a private resolution. 
 This result does not require the added arbitrators to have superior 
accuracy in their choices. The result requires that there are symmetric beliefs 
regarding the added arbitrators behaviors. Furthermore, it does not rely on 
symmetry in their accuracy. The proof could easily be extended to assuming 
z1 ≠ z2 for the two arbitrators. The crucial point is that divergent beliefs on 
an arbitrator are mitigated within a panel. 
 This result, though, depends upon agreement between the 
disputants over the accuracy of two of the arbitrators. Given that three 
panelists are employed, how does the outcome compare to the environment 
where there is uncertainty over more than one of the arbitrators? This would 
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occur, for example, when a party is confident in its appointment, but unsure 
about the other two arbitrators. 
 Hence, to extend further the analysis let rt(d*) denote the anticipated 
probability a majority receives a signal of di = d* as assessed by Party t in 
state d* when t is uncertain over two arbitrators. It follows that 
 
 rt(d*) = [pt(d*)]2 + 2z[1 – pt(d*)]pt(d*).      (6) 
 
Hence, a bargaining zone exists if  
 
[rx(D) – ry(D)]D < Cx + Cy when d* = D 
or     (7) 
[ry(0) – rx(0)]D < Cx + Cy  when d* = 0. 
 
When three arbitrators comprise a panel, how does uncertainty over one 
arbitrator compare to uncertainty over two? The following proposition 
provides the second result. 
 
Proposition 2: With optimistically-biased beliefs, rx(D) – ry(D) > 
qx(D) – qy(D) > 0 and ry(0) – rx(0) > qy(0) – qx(0) > 0. 
 
Thus, amongst the three-arbitrator panels, uncertainty over two arbitrators 
causes more continuances of the conflict than uncertainty over only one. 
 
2.3 Comparison of Institutions and Testable Predictions 
 Thus, in this simple framework two testable hypotheses arise. First, 
it follows from Proposition 1 that amongst a set of contract disputes, those 
decided by a panel are more likely to be resolved. This is because the set of 
parameters under which a nonempty bargaining zone exists is greater. As is 
commonly argued, this makes the likelihood of resolution greater (Deck and 
Farmer, 2007). 
 
 Hypothes is  1:  Disputes in which three arbitrators are selected are 
less likely to persist to  a final arbitral decision than those disputes to be 
resolved by one arbitrator. 
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Furthermore, amongst cases to be decided by a panel, those where the 
divergence of beliefs applies to fewer arbitrators are more likely to be settled. 
This derives from Proposition 2 that divergent beliefs on two arbitrators is 
less likely to have a nonempty bargaining than divergent beliefs on only on 
arbitrator.  
 
Hypothes is  2:  Disputes where the parties have non-divergent 
beliefs regarding the accuracy of at least two of the three arbitrators 
are less likely to persist to a final arbitral decision than disputes with 
only one arbitrator with non-divergent beliefs. 
 
Empirical data of contract disputes with differing compositions of 
arbitration panels with differing numbers of arbitrators can be exploited to 
test these two hypotheses. 
 
3. Background Information and Data  
 Contracts of Italian firms typically include a clause describing how 
disputes that arise will be dealt with. This clause is referred to as the Clausola 
Compromissoria. This clause describes the arbitration process to be used. The 
Italian civil code defining procedures for the Clausola (the Codice di Procedura 
Civile, §808) requires that such clauses either identify the name(s) of the 
individual(s) who will serve as an arbitrator if a dispute arises or specify the 
number of arbitrators to be used along with the procedure under which they 
are selected (Carpi and Taruffo, 2008). Thus, the institutional features of the 
arbitration process are determined before a conflict arises and are, therefore, 
exogenous to the dispute. For contract disputes that arise in Italy, the 
arbitration procedures are selected “behind the veil of ignorance” (Rawls, 
1971). 
 The Chamber of Commerce in Milan, known as the Camera di 
Commercio, has developed an arbitration council to facilitate the resolution of 
disputes through arbitration. The council is called the Camera Arbitrale 
Milano. Most Italian firms have coordinated on employing the use of the 
Camera in the clauses of their contracts. This includes not only Italian firms 
operating in Milan, but also Italian firms throughout the country contracting 
with other Italian firms and even in contracts with other European and 
international organizations.  
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 The Camera Arbitrale Milano publishes it rules governing the 
arbitration process respecting the previously contracted upon terms and 
providing the institutional features to be employed when the clause is 
incomplete (Arbitration Rules, 2011). The rules outline the important 
procedural issues such as the mechanism for submitting documents, use of 
expert witnesses, and timing of the steps of the process to name a few. 
 With regards to the selection and number of arbitrators the Camera’s 
rules allow for the contracted upon structure to remain. Unless otherwise 
agreed upon in the clause, if a sole arbitrator is to be used the Camera will 
appoint one. If the parties agree beforehand to use a council of three 
arbitrators, the Arbitration Rules stipulate that the default selection 
procedure is for each party to the dispute to unilaterally select their own 
arbitrator. The third arbitrator, who will also act as the panel’s president, will 
be appointed by the Camera. The clause may contain a provision, though, for 
the two selected arbitrators to pick the third. In this case, the Camera makes 
an appointment if the two arbitrators cannot reach a consensus within a 
predetermined time limit. 
 As a consequence, at the time of initiating the dispute the 
institutional structure of the arbitration process is known, i.e. whether one or 
three arbitrators is to be used and how the arbitrators will be selected, but 
the identify of the panel is not known.11 Once the arbitrators are selected, 
and they agree to serve, the collecting of documents and the holding of the 
hearings commence. After the determination of the arbitrators, but before 
the announcement of the arbitral award, the parties are free to withdraw 
their claims. The withdrawal can arise from a settlement being struck 
between the two parties or “other grounds” (i.e. withdrawing a claim due to 
a lack of supporting evidence).  
 Regarding the costs associated with the arbitration, initial filing fees 
are required. The Camera determines the size of the total fees as a function of 
number of arbitrators used, amount of evidence processed, etc. If a claim is 
withdrawn, though, a reduced final cost is due. Thus, settlement during the 
arbitration process provides the added benefit of further reducing costs. 
                                                 
11 A party may know his selection and, also, it is possible to know the identity of the 
other party’s selected arbitrator (since the identities may be contracted upon), but he 
is unlikely to be able to anticipate the identity of the entire panel. 
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 It is this choice to settle during the negotiation, after the 
information regarding the identity of the arbitrators and providing the 
opportunity to reduce expenses, that allows one to identify how the structure 
of the institution affects bargaining. The distinction between the benefit and 
motivation of ex ante ADR agreements, as explored here, and ex post ADR 
(the decision to utilize arbitration and other dispute resolution institutions 
made after the conflict arises) is discussed by Shavell (1995). 
The main source of data for the empirical analysis is the recorded 
information of disputes brought to the chamber in Milan, Camera Arbitrale 
Milano, from January 2007 to end of first quarter of 2010. The content of all 
arbitration cases filed in the period under review was analyzed in June 2011 
using a coding protocol developed by the authors. Over this period, by the 
time of the data collection, a total of 391 disputes were filed since the 
beginning of our investigation and had been completed either with an 
arbitral award or with settlement (and, hence, withdrawn from the Camera).   
Information from the records of each dispute was collected. The 
variables of interest for this study, together with their definition and 
descriptive statistics, are set out in Table 1 and Table 3. Five dummy 
variables are created. The variable award is equal to one if the case was 
concluded with the arbitrator(s) announcing an award. A value of award of 
zero indicates a withdrawal of the case due to a settlement being reached. 
This is the dependent variable in the econometric analysis.  
To test Hypothesis 1, the variable panel is equal to one if a panel of 
three arbitrators was used in the dispute. A value of zero indicates that only 
one arbitrator was selected. The Rules of Arbitration (2011) prohibit the use 
of an even number of arbitrators, presumably due to the use of majority 
voting within the panel, and there were not any recorded circumstances of a 
panel exceeding three.  
Third, information on the occupation of the arbitrators is provided. 
Arbitrators used in Milan are either privately-practicing lawyers or university 
professors, typically law professors. If a majority of the arbitrators used in a 
case hold an academic position, then the dummy variable prof equals one. We 
argue that prof can be used to test Hypothesis 2. Law professors have public 
track records of service and scholarship. Furthermore, it is common for 
university faculty to repeatedly serve as arbitrators. This is important because 
information of previous decisions may be known, i.e. so that there is a 
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reputation, and they have the incentive to do a good job so as to be selected 
in the future, i.e. so that they have reputational concerns. Furthermore, 
practicing attorneys could have professional concerns that make their 
decisionmaking uncertain from the perspective of the disputants. Finally, as 
obtaining a faculty position acts as a quality screening mechanism, more 
certainty may arise of those who can acquire such jobs. For these reasons we 
hypothesize that having multiple professors on the panel corresponds with 
less-divergence of the beliefs of the disputants. Consequently, support for 
Hypothesis 2 will arise if prof = 1 is associated with a decreased likelihood of 
award = 1. 
If the president of the panel was appointed by the disputants, then 
appoint = 1. Within a panel of three arbitrators, typically each party makes a 
selection, and these individuals then select the third member to act as the 
chair. If the selected arbitrators cannot reach an agreement, or if the initial 
clause in the contract does not specify this procedure, then the third 
arbitrator is selected by the Camera. In the case of a sole arbitrator again the 
default rules indicate that she is selected by the chamber (so that appoint = 0).  
The final dummy variable created from the case files is a 
measurement of the legal representation of the parties. The lawyer 
representing the claimant along with the name of the law firm under which 
he is employed is provided. The coding protocol used was to differentiate 
those disputes where the legal representation was provided by a member of a 
“big” law firm from those coming from a small practice. In the Italian legal 
community the identity of the large-scale law firms, employing numerous 
lawyers and staff, is well known.12 Thus, the variable lawfirm captures this 
distinction. The legal representation of the party not initiating the dispute is 
not included. One reason for this is that the information is not available for 
many cases since it is the claimants lawyer who files the initial paperwork. 
Also, when it is available it is highly correlated with the choice of legal 
representation of the claimant. This is to be expected. Ashenfelter and Dahl 
(2012) and Ashenfelter, Bloom, and Dahl (2013) argue, for example, that the 
                                                 
12 An Italian legal scholar with expertise in the civil procedure of Italy, and himself 
an occasional arbitrator, was consulted to create and verify the list of “big” law 
firms. Given the high statistical significance of this variable illustrated in the 
upcoming section, we are confident in the validity of our coding. 
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hiring of legal representation is a prisoner’s dilemma situation where both 
parties are in an arms race expending resources on more and expensive 
lawyers. Data from arbitration in New Jersey provides confirmation. 
In addition to these dummy variables, two other independent 
variables are created. The first, hearings, captures the activity level of each 
dispute by quantifying the number of hearings and the variable, documents, 
measures the number of technical reports, evidentiary statements, and other 
relevant documentations submitted. One would expect these to be correlated 
with the complexity of the case and, hence, be associated with continued 
conflict. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 As one can see, twice as many disputes in Milan’s chamber of 
commerce utilize three arbitrators as those with only one, while the cases are 
split between private resolution and continuation of the process to an 
awarding stage. The parties to the dispute select the panel president in less 
than one-sixth of the disputes. Thus, the Camera Arbitrale Milano must 
frequently make the selections. Interestingly, the number of hearings 
conducted and documents submitted exhibit large standard deviations 
relative to their mean values. Thus, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the 
degree of conflict and the stakes of the disputes. Finally, while a total of 391 
disputes were resolved over the time period, not every case file provided 
complete information. Thus, some variables suffer from missing values 
(third column of Table 1). For example, hearings is available for 85.4% of the 
cases (= 314/391). 
 The two hypotheses arising from the theoretical model predict that 
panel and prof affect the ability to reach a settlement, award. Table 2 provides 
initial evidence of the differentiation between the arbitration disputes that 
result in a final decision and those where private settlements occurred. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
 For those cases with three arbitrators there are almost 40% more 
cases that do not reach a final award than do. Interestingly, disputes with 
only one arbitrator do not reach an arbitral award occurring with a frequency 
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45% less. This suggests that there is a relationship between the two lending 
support for Hypothesis 1. Similarly, while outcomes are rather evenly split 
when university professors are not involved; when they are involved there is 
a decrease in the relative rate at which disputes persist until a final award. 
Again, this is suggestive of an influence of professors on settlements, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 2. 
 Disputes arise from a number of types of contracts. The data 
available allow us to control for a broad number of categories based on the 
content of the case.13 Table 3 presents these categorizations along with some 
basic descriptive information. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
 The chamber in Milan arbitrates a wide variety of cases. Each type 
of case differs in the persistence of conflict, construction of the arbitration 
panel, and legal representation. A Pearson X2 test confirms that the content 
of the case is independent of the award. 
 
4. Results 
 Thus, data from arbitration filings in Milan of contract disputes is 
used to test the two hypotheses derived from the theoretical model. To do 
this, logistic regressions are estimated with the binary variable, award, as the 
dependent variable. Controls for the content of the cases along with 
information regarding the institutional arrangement are included. Table 4 
presents the results. 
 
TABLE 4 
 
                                                 
13 Again, expertise in Italian law was consulted. To clarify the sale of business 
category includes any transfer of ownership of a business or franchise agreement, 
while joint ventures are treated separately. Contracts regarding the distribution of 
goods are separating from both contracts on the sales of goods as well as contracts 
on the supplies of inputs. Governance relates to disputes regarding shareholders, 
boards, and executive management. Procurement disputes differ from supply 
contracts in that only in the latter is a signed contract between the buyer and seller 
of a single good exist. Procurements include contracts for bundles of services. 
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 Column I provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 that a three-
person panel of arbitrators facilitates private resolutions. A case, controlling 
for the types of contracts being disputed, is only 35.7% as likely to continue 
to a final decision if a panel is utilized, as compared to using only a single 
arbitrator.  
 The specification in Column II adds additional control variables. 
Conflicts that involve more hearings with more documentation are 
associated with situations where private resolutions fail. If legal 
representation from a big law firm is utilized, then there is a decreased 
likelihood of continued conflict. This is in line with previous research on the 
value of legal representation in litigation (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 2001).  
 While the statistical significance of panel remains, the results in 
Column II suggest that an appointment of the chair by the parties to the 
dispute increases private settlements. This result is to be expected since 
agreement on the selection of the panel president is likely correlated with the 
ability to reach an agreement to the dispute. The insignificance of the 
coefficient on appoint in Column IV suggests that university faculty members 
are often the one’s being appointed by the parties so that it is unclear 
whether it is the confidence in the professors or the agreement on the third 
arbitrator that facilitates settlement. Evidence of this multicollinearity exists. 
The correlation between appoint and prof is 0.38 (p-value < 0.01). 
 The results in Column III indicate that if at least a majority of the 
arbitrators are university professors, then it is unlikely that the case will 
proceed to a final arbitral award. This variable too loses significance in the 
final column. It is worth pointing out that the results in Table 4 pool all 
cases, whether they involve one arbitrator or three, into one data set. Given 
that each specification controls for the size of the panel, the coefficient on 
prof measures the marginal effect of a university professor when only one 
arbitrator is being used. The results from the theoretical model specifically 
predict that amongst the three-arbitrator panels, the employment of 
individuals with more certain and less divergent beliefs facilitates private 
settlement (Hypothesis 2). To address this question two approaches are 
utilized and reported in Table 5. First, an interaction term between panel and 
prof is included to differentiate the impact of university professors in the two 
settings. Second, the subsample of cases with three arbitrators utilized is 
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considered separately. Again, in each specification controls for the content 
of the dispute is included. 
 
TABLE 5 
 
 The results in Table 5 provide evidence in support of the second 
hypothesis arising from the theoretical model. University law professors have 
much publicly available information and reputational considerations matter. 
Consequently, there should be less divergence of the beliefs of the disputants 
when law professors make up the majority of the panel. In these cases, the 
chance of a conflict continuing all the way to an arbitral decision is only 21.4 
– 33.3% as likely.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 A wide variety of institutional arrangements exist for the arbitration 
of disputes. While previous research has focused on the distinction between 
conventional and final-offer arbitration, we investigate the use of panels and 
the composition of the panel and their identity. A theoretical model merging 
the impact of uncertainty in bargaining with the accuracy of group 
decisionmaking is developed to provide empirically testable predictions. 
Data from disputes in Milan, Italy is utilized to conduct these tests. Our 
main finding is that panels of arbitrators allow for the muting of 
uncertainties over the quality of the decisionmaking in arbitration. While this 
result is simply an application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we are able to 
show that this mitigation facilitates settlements and private resolutions to the 
conflicts. Furthermore, if it is possible to further reduce uncertainty by 
providing better information on the arbitrators, such as utilizing university 
professors with reputations and public records, even more settlements can 
be encouraged.  
 We are able to provide these empirical results due to the exogenous 
variation in institutional arrangements utilized in Italy. Since arbitration 
clauses are not standardized, yet agreed upon at the creation of the contract, 
the dispute if it does arise is independent of the institution used. Hence, the 
connection between institutional arrangements and bargaining success can 
be explored. We show that disputes arise and the pre-conditioned arbitration 
process is initiated. Then the arbitrators are selected. In situations where 
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uncertainty is now mitigated bargaining is successful and the case is 
withdrawn. In circumstances where the selection of the arbitrators does not 
reduce uncertainty to a sufficient amount, conflict persists. 
 The analysis focuses on settlement acknowledging that conflict is 
costly. Thus, private resolution increases the well-being of both parties and 
eliminates the use of public resources. We are unable to address the 
distribution of the surplus created/saved (i.e. wealth effects). Similarly, the 
deterrence of the contract breaches is not considered (Drahozal and Hylton, 
2003). Also, we use the crude proxy of the number of university professors 
to measure uncertainty. More detailed knowledge on the backgrounds of the 
arbitrators and particulars of the dispute may be necessary to design 
improved mechanisms. For example, Baye and Wright (2011) provide 
evidence that U.S. Federal judges with additional training in economics are 
well-suited to preside over antitrust cases as their decisions are appealed at 
lower rates. Future work on these issues should help craft improved 
arbitration processes saving time and resources. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
variable  description     # of obs. mean  st. dev. 
 
 
award  = 1 if the arbitrator(s) made an award 391  0.491  0.501 
panel  = 1 if three arbitrators used   389  0.666  0.472 
prof  = 1 if majority are professors   391  0.455  0.498 
appoint  = 1 if president is selected by the parties 391  0.169  0.375 
lawfirm  = 1 if claimant’s attorney from big law firm 389  0.141  0.349 
hearings  # of hearings     314  2.379  1.992 
documents # of documents submitted      378  6.389  5.079 
  
 
 
 
Table 2: Arbitrator Panels 
 
  award = 1     award = 0  
  # of obs. %    # of obs. % 
  
             
 
panel = 1  108  27.8%    151  38.8%  
panel = 0  84  21.6%    46  11.8% 
 
prof = 1  85  21.9%    93  23.9% 
prof = 0  107  27.5%    106  27.2%  
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Table 3: Content of the Case 
 
content   # of obs. % award = 1 % panel = 1 % lawfirm = 1 
             
 
company law  136  58%  76%  22% 
procurement  65  29%  75%  6% 
commercial distribution 36  69%  42%  8% 
commercial sale  22  50%  62%  10% 
sale of business  21  24%  48%  10% 
supply contract  22  41%  55%  14% 
consulting   13  69%  54%  0% 
trademarks/patents   10  50%  60%  40% 
joint venture  6  67%  0%  0% 
insurance   4  50%  100%  25% 
other   56  43%  73%  11% 
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Table 4: Logistic Results 
(dep. var. = award) 
  I   II   III   IV  
             ____    
 
panel 0.357 ***  0.244 ***       0.222 ***         0.251 ***       
   (0.088)   (0.093)   (0.082)   (0.014)  
 
hearings      1.562 ***  1.564 ***  1.580 ***    
     (0.190)   (0.190)   (0.194)           
                
documents    1.243 ***   1.252 ***    1.251 *** 
     (0.059)   (0.060)   (0.060)         
 
lawfirm     0.352 **    0.360 ***     0.381 **       
     (0.165)   (0.169)     (0.180)     
 
appoint    0.475 *      0.586     
     (0.01)      (0.257)  
 
prof       0.514 **           0.586      
        (0.166)   (0.199)      
 
content? YES   YES   YES   YES 
 
N  389   309   309   309 
Pseudo-R2 0.091   0.331   0.333   0.396 
  
% correct 64.0%   77.7%   78.3%   79.0% 
 
 
* 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.  
Each specification includes a constant term. 
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Table 5: Additional Results 
(dep. var. = award) 
     Interaction   Panel Subsample  
                ____ 
panel     0.378 ** 
     (0.165) 
 
hearings      1.582 ***       1.542 ***   
     (0.191)    (0.227)              
                
documents    1.250 ***   1.267 *** 
     (0.059)    (0.074)   
         
lawfirm    0.372 **   0.330 ** 
     (0.177)    (0.164)     
     
prof    1.532     0.333 *** 
     (0.953)    (0.135)     
  
panel x prof   0.214 **     
     (0.156) 
content?    YES    YES    
N     309    194 
Pseudo-R2    0.345    0.304 
% correct    78.3%    77.3% 
 
10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level. 
Each specification includes a constant term. 
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Appendix 
 
The Appendix provides the formal proofs of the propositions in the text. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose d* = D. It follows from (4) that qx(D) – 
qy(D) = z2 + 2px(D)z(1 – z) – z2 – 2py(D)z(1 – z) = 2z(1 – z){px(D) – py(D)}. 
Since z ∈ (0,1), 2z(1 – z) < 1. Optimism bias implies px(D)– py(D). Hence, 
px(D) – py(D) > qx(D) – qy(D) > 0. Suppose d* = 0. It follows from (4) that 
qy(0) – qx(0) = 2z(1 – z){py(0) – px(0)}. Optimism bias implies py(0) > px(0). 
Hence, py(0) – px(0) > qy(0) – qx(0) > 0.      
   ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose d* = D. It follows from (6) that rx(D) – 
ry(D) = [px(D)]2 + 2zpx(D)[1 – py(D)] – [px(D)]2 – 2zpy(D)[1 – py(D)] = 
{[px(D)]2 – [py(D)]2}(1 – 2z) + 2z[px(D) –py(D)]. It follows from (4) that qx(D) 
– qy(D) = 2z[px(D)– py(D)] – 2z2[px(D) – py(D)]. Consequently, rx(D) – ry(D) is 
greater than qx(D) – qy(D) when {[px(D)]2 – [py(D)]2}(2z – 1) < 2z2[px(D) – 
py(D)]. This simplifies to require [px(D) + py(D)] < 2z2 / [2z – 1]. Notice that 
the right-hand-side, R(z) = 2z2 / [2z – 1], is decreasing in z and R(1) = 2. 
Since px(D) + py(D) < 2, rx(D) – ry(D) > qx(D) – qy(D). Similarly, ry(0) – rx(0) 
= {[py(0)]2 – [px(0)]2}(1 – 2z) + 2z[py(0) –px(0)] and, from Proposition 1, qy(0) 
– qx(0) = 2z(1 – z){py(0) – px(0)}. For the former to exceed the latter, this 
requires [py(0) – px(0)] < 2z2 / [2z – 1]. Hence, ry(0) – rx(0) > qy(0) – qx(0).
 ■ 
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